A Principled Approach to Enriching Security-related Data for Running Processes through Statistics and Natural Language Processing

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Abstract: We propose a principled method of enriching security related information for running processes. Our methodology applies to large organizational infrastructures, where information is properly collected and stored. The data we use is based on the Hubble Stack (an open-source project), but any alternative solution that provides the same type of information will suffice. Using statistical and natural language processing (NLP) methods we enrich our data with tags and we provide an analysis on how these tags can be used in Machine Learning approaches for anomaly detection.

1 INTRODUCTION

Logging and monitoring are the most common tools used by security teams across organizations with the purpose of detecting breaches and reacting to incidents. In simple environments, rule-based systems are able to quickly identify and alert on suspicious events. However, in complex cloud-based infrastructures, the inter-dependencies between various cloud components (storage, computing, database, authentication etc.) makes it hard to detect systems that operate outside of normal parameters. Also, maintenance or quick-fix operational events represent a large portion of the noise that poises the data and adds overhead for the security teams. In addition to that, logging and verbosity are not necessarily standardised across the entire infrastructure and this can be treated as a separate topic.

Arguably, a deterministic process for well-documented infrastructures can be as basic as: use a list of allowed processes for each instance, a table for scheduled execution and alert on any event that contradicts these rules. In practice, this is is not feasible for most infrastructures (a fact demonstrated by the time-lapse between the incidents and their detection) and the most common reasons are:

- Development cycles for applications and cloud services often lack behavioral documentation until the final (production) stage;
- Manual interventions such as planned maintenance and quick fixes for critical system outages (CSOs) often impact normal system behavior. As a rule of thumb, the larger the infrastructure the more noise/false positives you get in your data;
- Third party software that undergoes upgrades will often behave differently after an update. Also, there are not many cases where you receive a complete specification that documents all the changes/operations a given application will cause to your instances;
- Most of the open-source stack will often rely on scripts that run other applications for upgrade, backup and synchronization (curl, wget, git, cc, g++, awk, diff, etc.);
- Last but not least, rule-based systems are hard to maintain and often fall behind of the number of changes that affect your cloud infrastructure.

As such, heuristic and statistical methods are always welcomed as an additional security layer, since they are low-maintenance and, if implemented properly, are able to scale with your infrastructure.

We propose a different approach to cloud-based anomaly detection in running processes: (a) enrich the data with labels, (b) automatically analyze the labels to establish their importance and assign weights and (c) score events and instances using these weights.
This type strategy has several advantages:

- Reduces the effects of data sparsity and allows training of simple models using a small amount of data, without overfitting - see section 4;
- Enables the macro-level analysis for a specific instance, instead of triggering alerts for individual events, that are often not informative. Usually, a security compromise will trigger multiple alerts whenever probing and lateral movement attempts start. Macro-level analysis makes it easy to spot spikes in alerts. Instances that are likely to be affected by the intrusion are the ones interlinked with the breached instance. This means that you can also benefit from grouping together instances that are dependent (we call them “accounts”), but it is not mandatory to do so;
- Makes it easier for security analysts to go over the alerts and see what triggered by looking at the labels.

2 RELATED WORK

Machine learning applied in the field of security has received a growing interest in recent years. Some interesting contributions include behavioral based analysis of malware, high-level feature generation using various deep learning methods (e.g. vector quantization), intrusion detection systems, malware signature generation and many others (Noor et al., 2019; Zhou et al., 2020; Gomathi et al., 2020; Das et al., 2020; Gibert et al., 2020; Piplai et al., 2020).

When it comes to SIEM-based solutions, static rules and machine learning (ML) for anomaly detection are used as a primary filtering and alerting mechanism. Their application is narrowed to specific use-cases. For instance, (Anumol, 2015) introduce a statistical ML model for intrusion detection based on network logs, while (Shi et al., 2018) uses deep learning to predict if a domain is malicious or not. (Feng et al., 2017) present a ML user-centred model designed to reduce the number of false positive alerts generated by static rules.

Based on the number of research papers (Idhammad et al., 2018; Suresh and Anitha, 2011; Zekri et al., 2017; Osanaiye et al., 2016), Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) was given significantly more attention, probably because the successful execution of these types of attacks yields in major service outages. However, neither of them addressed the issue of finding and uncovering indicators of compromise which can firmly tell that a system was compromised with attacker having control of the same.

The work of (Hendler et al., 2018) is related to our own research. However, there are several major differences: the authors target PowerShell activity with their focus being on command-line activity only, and not other attributes of the event using a purely supervised approach.

Also, it is important to note that we focus on aggregating risk scores at instance level, instead of alerting on every single anomaly. A similar effort is described by (Bryant and Saiedian, 2020). They propose adding metadata to cyber kill chain that following a divide and conquer approach to different kinds of system activities and their combinations. On the other hand, a leading SIEM vendor in risk based alerting (RBA) space tries to take it a step further by monitoring system activity by combining multiple data sources to look across the board1. This increases the likelihood of catching anomalous activity, be it operational or an actual security threat. But these solutions again don’t solve the problem of static rules and constant intervention by the security analysts to maintain them.

3 DATASET DESCRIPTION

The data involved in the research can generically be described as host activity data, where by host we understand an individual computing resource. In our case, the computing resources are virtual machines in the public cloud, which are equipped with a software agent called Hubble2. The role of the agent is to collect information from the computing instance and to send it to a centralized log management solution. The agent collects data like: recorded users, command line history, outbound connections, processes being executed, environment variables, critical files modified and so on.

The work presented in this paper uses the data extracted by Hubble for running processes. The main three categories (source types) of events are: (a) running processes; (b) running processes listening for network connections; (c) running processes with established outbound network connections;

The later two mentioned source-type overlap with the first one, but they provide additional information as: source port/IP, destination, listening port.

For clarity, we will enumerate all the fields present in the meta-data associated with running processes:

2https://hubblestack.io/
• **Account ID**: the account from where the data is collected (this was mentioned in the introduction);
• **Cloud Instance ID**: unique identifier of the computing resource;
• **Parent Process Name**: the service/binary process that generated the event (apache, bash, jupyter and so on);
• **Process Name**: the main utility used for the execution of the command (bash, php, mysql and so on);
• **User**: the local user account under which the parent process is already running (and with what privileges);
• **Group**: the local group to which the User is allocated;
• **Command Line**: the full execution of the process with all involved parameters or additional services;
• **Environment Variables**: system and user variables associated with the event and user;
• **Open Files**: threads associated with the execution of the process (files that the process reads or writes);
• **Path**: the logic location on the disk from where the process is being executed;
• **Time**: a timestamp of the moment when that event was generated (when the process was executed).

Each account generates an unique subset of data dependent on the services it provides. Also, each account has a different number of computing resources associated and a different computing load. Because of these factors, the data generated by an account over a period of time differs from the others. Some accounts are highly active and can generate up to dozens of millions of events in a two hour time frame, while others can generate just tens of thousands of events. In order to preserve this uniqueness, we treat each account separately but with an identical processing pipeline.

Also, due to technical limitations, we aggregate the data before we process it. For aggregation we use all the fields mentioned before, except the *time* field, which is replaced with a count value. This way, we extract only the unique events themselves with an associated number of occurrences. By doing so, we limit the data generated by one account to a maximum of a couple of hundred thousands of observations for every two hour interval.

### 4 PROPOSED METHODOLOGY

While some anomalies can be caught by purely statistical approaches, it is often the case where data sparsity makes it difficult to spot outliers. This is a specific trait of text-based data and because we are dealing with command-lines, our dataset partially falls into this category.

Our methodology (see Figure 1)<sup>3</sup> overcomes this by adding a description layer to raw data examples in the form of tags. The role of these tags is two-fold: (a) bring domain-specific knowledge inspired by the way security analysts perform their investigation and (b) reduce data sparsity.

In what follows, we will describe our tagging strategy (Section 4.1), introduce two methods for scoring the events (one supervised and one unsupervised) (Section 4.2) and validate our approach (Section 5)

#### 4.1 Describing Events using Tags

As security experts, whenever we analyse an event or a series of events, we don’t blindly go head-on and check every possible anomaly. Instead, we look for specific indications of compromises such as particular commands (e.g. “netcat”, “telnet”, “useradd”) or system users (“www-data”, “mysql” etc.) running abnormal commands.

The tags we generate are meant to highlight some particular behaviors of compromised applications. Indeed, they are not straight-forward indications of malicious activity but when combined they are able outline some suspicious events that are potential candidates for further analysis.

For clarity, we will detail each individual tag or tagset:

- **FIRST_TIME_SEEN_ANOMALY**: a tag applied to newly observed command-lines, based on historical records. This tag is applied after the cleanup process (see below note for clarification);
- **RARE_OUTBOUND_CONNECTION**: is applied if a process generates an outbound connection to a host that appears in less than 1% of the data;
- **RARE_LISTENING_PORT**: is applied for a process that opens a listening port and, based on past observations, that listening port is used in less than 1% of the data;

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<sup>3</sup>The distinction between malicious/benign examples only apply for the supervised part - see section 4.2.2 for details.
CMD_ENTROPY: this tagset is based on the perplexity of the command-line, which is computed using a tri-gram language model (LM) with simple interpolation smoothing. We also use corpora-wide statistics for perplexity ($\mu$ and $\sigma$) to generate three flavours of this tag:

MEDIUM: if perplexity is between $(\mu + \sigma, \mu + 2\sigma)$

HIGH: if perplexity is between $(\mu + 2\sigma, \mu + 4\sigma)$

EXTREME: if perplexity is larger than $\mu + 4\sigma$

RARE_PROCESS_PATH: the presence of this tag signifies that the process is launched from an atypical location - less than 1% of the instances of this process are executed from this location;

RARE_PARENT: based on the process tree, this process has had the given parent process in less than 1% of the observations;

RARE_USER_PROCESS_PAIR: the specific user has executed the current process in less than 1% of the observations. This only applies for a specific list of known system users: “mysql”, “root”, “www-data”, “postgresql”, “ldap” etc. Any manually added user instance will never trigger this tag.

ENV_RARE_PATH: this tag is set whenever the PATH environment variable has a combination of values which is not frequent. In this case we use a absolute threshold value of 5;

ENV_MISSING_PATH: this tag is set if the PATH variable is empty or missing for a specific process. The tag is only triggered if, for that specific process, based on past observations, the variable was present and non-empty in more than 95% of the cases;

ENV_RARE_LD_LIBRARY_PATH: analog to ENV_RARE_PATH;

ENV_MISSING_LD_LIBRARY_PATH: analog to ENV_MISSING_PATH;

ENV_RARE_PWD: analog to ENV_RARE_PATH;

ENV_MISSING_PWD: analog to ENV_MISSING_PATH;

USER_CMD: this tag is set if the user that launched a command is not in our list of known system users. This might not be entirely accurate, since we maintain this list manually, but it holds in most of the cases;

CMD_<command>: this is a multipurpose tag used in conjunctions with a list of applications/command-line tools that we chose to track. This list includes most command-line interface (CLI) UNIX/Linux tools (wget, curl, nc, telnet, ssh, useradd, usermod, groupadd etc.) and some additional non-standard packages. This tag is dynamically generated whenever we encounter one of the target CLI commands. For instance, when we see a curl command, we automatically add CMD_CURL, when we see a pwd we add CMD_PWD and so on.

PATH_<path>: this is also a multipurpose tag, based on a defined list on interesting system paths that might appear inside the text body of an executed command. Example of such paths are: /dev/mem, /dev/tcp, /dev/kmem, /etc/hostname,
The scope of such tags is to highlight activity that might indicate manual manipulation of system files or services. For example, an user can initiate an outbound connection from the host without using the standard utilities like `wget` or `curl`, but by using such utilities like:

```bash
bash -i &
```

```text
/dev/tcp/attacker_ip/attacker_port0>&1.
```

- **PARENT_**(`parent_name`): the purpose of this tag is to highlight events which are being executed by interesting parents, from a security point of view. Parent processes like `apache`, `nginx`, `httpd`, `cupsd`, `mysqld` and so on are on their own rare events and can highlight abuse of that particular process or service. Such tags bring more context and correlations to the tag analysis phase.

- **IP_PUBLIC/ IP_PRIVATE**: this tag is attributed in two cases. **First**, the event is generated by a process which establishes an outbound connection and we have information regarding the destination IP. **Second**, the command line itself contains one or multiple character sequences representing IPs. Once all IPs are extracted they are classified as PUBLIC or PRIVATE IPs. Such information is highly useful in classifying what kind or activity is a processes behaving.

- **REF_LOCALHOST**: tag highlights events where the localhost component is referenced. This can be done by using the `localhost` syntax in network connections oriented commands or the localhost IP itself `127.0.0.1`. Network connections commands containing only localhost without other IP tags (especially `IP_PUBLIC` tag) should have a smaller impact in a decision process.

- **PROCESS_APEARS_LESS_THAN_5_TIMES**: this tag is highly depended on the cloud environment for which the tag is generated. Its purpose is to inform on processes that occurs very rare (few times seen). Such a tag can have a short life, if the process itself becomes a common component of the environment. But in case of a malicious event, skilled attackers can use system utilities (which aren't commonly executed) reach their goals. Such a tag can filter down new and interesting events recently reported.

**NOTE.** For the LM and the **FIRST_TIME_SEEN** tags we use a pre-processing step in which all command- lines are stripped of numbers and random character sequences. This is done by passing them through a tool called Stringifier, which is an open-source ML model that identifies high-entropy strings (passwords, hashes, API keys) as well as strings that follow specific patterns (e.g. IP addresses).

For events labelling, we look at various event data fields and generate tags as per inherit characteristics of those fields. Tags capture certain facets of the event or log, which are important in terms of security incident detection point of view. One of the common tags generated is **FIRST_TIME_SEEN_ANOMALY** when command in an anomalous event is seen first time for particular account. Another tag **USER_CMD** accounts for commands that are executed explicitly by users on production instances. Similarly, tags are generated for user commands executed on instances. Certain tags accounts for environment variable abnormality. Tags are also generated for network related artifacts. For example, the IP_PUBLIC or IP_PRIVATE tags describe the type of the destination resource for that network connection (local network or public/internet). Tags like **REF_LOCALHOST** describe processes that connect via network protocols to other services available on the same computing machine hosting the processes (ex: 127.0.0.1 or localhost).

### 4.2 Risk based Scoring

As tags are not direct indicators of compromise, the role of risk-based scoring (RBS) is to highlight suspect activity by jointly analysing the assigned labels. For simplicity, we define our scoring method as a linear function between the input features (combinations of labels/tags) with a scalar output. The primary goal is to assign high scores to suspicious activity and low scores to normal operations.

There are two main ways to compute the scoring model: supervised learning and unsupervised learning. Both methods have their merits and demerits. For instance, unsupervised learning is likely to perform worse on this dataset than its supervised counterpart. On the other hand, supervised learning requires labeled data, which is not easy to come. Furthermore, the bias of this training data is likely to also bias the model.

This is why we will analyze both approaches in the following sections and compare the results.

#### 4.2.1 Unsupervised Scoring

Customary, Term Frequency Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) has been used to analyze observations based on associated tags/words. In our case, tags are unique per observation, thus there is a strong correlation between the term frequency and inverse document frequency, rendering TF-IDF not an good
Table 1: Converting set to N-grams.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Set</th>
<th>Unigrams</th>
<th>Bigrams</th>
<th>Trigrams</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(CMD, CP, RARE, PARENT, USER, CMD)</td>
<td>(CMD, CP), (RARE, PARENT), (USER, CMD)</td>
<td>(CMD, CP, RARE, PARENT), (CMD, CP, USER, CMD), (RARE, PARENT, USER, CMD)</td>
<td>(CMD, CP, RARE, PARENT, USER, CMD)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Example of N-grams and their probabilities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>N-Grams</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.001958</td>
<td>ENV, RARE, PWD, PARENT, SSHD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.176561</td>
<td>RARE, USER, PROCESS, PAIR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.015053</td>
<td>RARE, PARENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.000012</td>
<td>CMD, EXTREME, ENTROPY, CMD, PS, PARENT, PYTHON</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Candidate for our goal. Instead, we focus on two unsupervised methodologies for detecting correlations between tags and assigning scores: a probabilistic n-gram approach and frequent itemset mining.

Probabilistic N-gram Approach. In this method, the event’s tags are arranged into unique combinations of tags to represent unigrams, bigrams and trigrams, as shown in Table 1. The occurrence frequency of a specific n-gram provides an idea about how often the tags in n-gram are expected to appear together. We also expect that frequent n-grams are correlated with normal operations, while rare n-grams are related to what can be considered anomalous events (see Table 2 for examples). Thus, our scoring procedure is defined as follows: (a) compute n-gram probabilities (we use maximum likelihood estimates); (b) assign a “rarity score” for each n-gram computed as the negative log likelihood of that n-gram appearing. If \( G_k \) is the set of all n-gram combinations for event \( E_k \) and \( P_t \) is the probability of observing tag \( t \), than the RBA score for \( E_k \) is defined by Equation 1

\[
RBA_{E_k} = - \sum_{t \in G_k} \log P_t \tag{1}
\]

Frequent Itemset Mining. A common use case of Frequent Itemset Mining involves identifying relations among items purchased by shoppers, and generating association rules to better understand buying behaviors and provide better incentives. Similarly, in our use case we can derive associations among tags and their frequency by using the Apriori Algorithm (Agarwal et al., 1994). Table 3 shows support score of tags generated using this approach.

Similar to the probabilistic n-gram model, we use the negative logarithm of the support value in our scoring.

4.2.2 Supervised Scoring

The dataset used for supervised scoring is composed on 10K benign events (collected for our own logs) and 245 malicious command-lines extracted from open data-sources. For training/testing we split the data into two subsets, while carefully preserving the ratio between malicious and benign examples. 70% of the data was used for training and 30% for testing.

Our scoring model is a single layer perceptron with sparse input. For computational efficiency, instead of performing n-hot encoding and sparse matrix multiplications, we preferred to link each feature to the weight it would normally trigger in the perceptron model. This way, the output activation for a given example input is computed by summing over the weights of the non-zero (present) features in that particular example. This is similar to the probabilistic n-gram approach, but instead of using the negative log-likelihood for an n-gram we now use a precomputed weight.

To train our model, we initialized our feature weights with zeros (this is a linear model) and we used the delta-rule update (Equations 2 and 3).

\[
y_{E_k} = \sum_{t \in G_k} w_t \tag{2}
\]

\[
\Delta w_t = \eta \cdot (t_{E_k} - y_{E_k}) \tag{3}
\]

where \( G_k \) has the same meaning as before, \( y_{E_k} \) is the predicted output for example \( E_k \), \( t_{E_k} \) is the desired output for that examples and \( \eta \) is the learning rate.

Note 1. While both unsupervised methods generate scores for unigrams, we don’t use this type of feature in our scoring, because, as stated earlier, tags out of context are not informative enough to provide the necessary support for deciding if an event is malicious or not.  

\footnote{We used a learning rate of 1e−4.}
Note 2. In the training phase of the unsupervised methods we only use the benign dataset, because adding malicious examples in the mix would prone the model to consider them non-anomalies at runtime.

Note 3. The supervised and unsupervised methods generate scores for known tag combinations. However, there are always situations where the algorithm can encounter previously unseen tag combinations during runtime. We observed that best results are obtained by scoring this special class of rare events with a constant value.

5 EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION

We validate our approach using an artificially constructed dataset, which was assembled through a similar strategy as the one presented in Section 4.2.2. We note that the manually introduced malicious events have not been previously used in training the supervised scoring function.

Ideally, we would prefer that the risk score would highlight malicious events by assigning high values to them. As such, we use a linear and an exponential decay function for evaluating both the supervised and unsupervised scoring methods. Alternatively, we could use the F-score computed on a limited number of events. However, we feel that hard limits such as top $k$ events or score thresholds don’t fully characterize the system, since their choice can yield high recall values by generating large and unmanageable numbers of events.

Let $e_k$ be one malicious event with score $s_k$ and $b_k$ the number of benign events that have a score $s_i > s_k$. Then, our linear decay function ($L$) is defined by Equation 4 and our exponential ($E$) decay function by Equation 5.

$$L_{e_k} = \frac{1}{1 + 2 \cdot b_k}$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

$$E_{e_k} = \frac{1}{2^{b_k}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

The model is characterized by the average scores over all malicious events ($\frac{1}{m} \sum_{k=1}^{m} L_{e_k}$ and $\frac{2}{m} \sum_{k=1}^{m} E_{e_k}$, respectively).

Note. Benign examples are not explicitly modeled in our evaluation, because they are used in scoring of the malicious events, which makes them indirect participants to the overall accuracy.

Table 4 shows the results for all the presented models, using both evaluation metrics.

Table 4: Model evaluation using linear and exponential decay scoring.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Linear</th>
<th>Exponential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supervised Delta</td>
<td>0.9470</td>
<td>0.9461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Itemset Mining</td>
<td>0.6255</td>
<td>0.5962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-Grams</td>
<td>0.5033</td>
<td>0.4798</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

We introduced a methodology of reducing data sparsity and introducing domain-specific knowledge at the same time, into security related application logs. We explored both supervised and unsupervised methods of performing risk-based-scoring and we evaluated our methods using an artificially created dataset.

The results show the obvious: supervised score generation works better than unsupervised methods (at least for this type of data). However, we do argue that it is not always possible to collect or generate labeled data, hence both methods bring their own value.

A potential use case for unsupervised methods is to highlight operational hygiene issues for a specific cloud account. If an environment follows operational and security best practices the number and the diversity of anomalous events would be uniform. An unsupervised approach could highlight deviation from such expectations.

We further plan to extend this methodology by adding more types of labels and introduce additional types of data. Extending our research on the unsupervised and supervised scoring methods is also on our road-map.

REFERENCES


