

Knowledge-based Confidentiality-preserving Query Answering

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- 1 The Controlled Query Evaluation approach in Ontologies and Description Logics
 - CQE in Description Logics through GA sensors
 - Computational problems
- 2 Towards tractability 1: Intersecting the sensors
 - IGA sensors
 - Expressive limitations of IGA sensors
- 3 Towards tractability 2: Adding preferences
 - Globally optimal and Pareto-optimal sensors
 - DD and k-DD sensors
 - Experimental results
- 4 Towards tractability 3: Maximally cooperative approach
 - The dynCQE approach
 - Complexity of dynCQE
- 5 Conclusions

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- Scenario: system providing access (query answering service) to a dataset
- Problem: enforce a **confidentiality-preserving policy**
 - i.e. some data cannot be disclosed to the system users
- Solution 1: **modify the dataset** in order to enforce the policy
 - and do not change the system/query answering service
- Solution 2: **modify the query answering service** in order to enforce the policy
 - and do not change the dataset

Controlled Query Evaluation (CQE) in Description Logics

We study confidentiality-preserving query answering in Description Logics (DLs) in the spirit of **Controlled Query Evaluation (CQE)**

CQE is a confidentiality-preserving query answering approach studied:

- in databases [*Sicherman et al., TODS 1983*]
- in Description Logic (DL) ontologies [*Bonatti and Sauro, ISWC 2013*], [*Cuenca Grau et al., IJCAI 2015*]

In CQE:

- the **policy** is specified in terms of **logical formulas**
- the enforcement of the policy is formalized through the notion of **censor**
- a censor models the **answers** that the query answering system should provide
- an **optimal censor** **maximizes** query answers still guaranteeing that the policy is not violated

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- the **policy** is specified in terms of **logical formulas**
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In [IJCAI 2019] we consider a CQE instance $\mathcal{E} = \langle \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P} \rangle$, where:

- \mathcal{T} is a DL TBox, representing intensional knowledge (i.e., the schema)
- \mathcal{A} is a DL ABox, that is a set of facts (i.e., the data instance)
- \mathcal{P} is the policy, i.e., a set of *denial assertions* of the form $\forall \vec{x}. cq(\vec{x}) \rightarrow \perp$, s.t. $\exists \vec{x}. cq(\vec{x})$ is a Conjunctive Query (CQ)

A user asks queries over the TBox \mathcal{T} , but must not get as result data that let her answer a query $\exists \vec{x}. cq(\vec{x})$ occurring in a denial assertions in \mathcal{P} .

A **sensor** is a function that modifies query answers to ensure this behaviour!

Ground Atoms (GA) Censors

Notation: $\text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A})$ denotes the set of facts (aka GAs) implied by $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{A}$.

A *GA censor* \mathbf{c} for a CQE instance $\mathcal{E} = \langle \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P} \rangle$ is a function that returns a set (called the *theory of the censor*) $\text{Th}_{\mathbf{c}} \subseteq \text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A})$ s.t. $\mathcal{T} \cup \text{Th}_{\mathbf{c}} \not\models \neg \mathcal{P}$.

\mathbf{c} is *optimal* if there is no GA censor \mathbf{c}' for \mathcal{E} such that $\text{Th}_{\mathbf{c}} \subset \text{Th}_{\mathbf{c}'}$

Example:

$\mathcal{T} = \{ \text{TakesMedB} \sqsubseteq \exists \text{admissionWard}; \text{Diabetic} \sqsubseteq \exists \text{admissionWard} \}$

$\mathcal{A} = \{ \text{TakesMedA}(\text{bob}), \text{TakesMedB}(\text{bob}), \text{Diabetic}(\text{bob}), \text{TakesMedA}(\text{ann}), \text{Diabetic}(\text{ann}), \text{TakesMedA}(\text{joe}) \}$

$\mathcal{P} = \{ \forall x. \text{TakesMedA}(x) \wedge \text{Diabetic}(x) \rightarrow \perp; \forall x. \text{TakesMedB}(x) \wedge \text{Diabetic}(x) \rightarrow \perp \}$

Secrets = $\{ \{ \text{TakesMedA}(\text{bob}), \text{Diabetic}(\text{bob}) \}, \{ \text{TakesMedB}(\text{bob}), \text{Diabetic}(\text{bob}) \}, \{ \text{TakesMedA}(\text{ann}), \text{Diabetic}(\text{ann}) \} \}$

$\text{Th}_{\mathbf{c}_1} = \{ \text{TakesMedA}(\text{bob}), \text{TakesMedB}(\text{bob}), \text{TakesMedA}(\text{ann}), \text{TakesMedA}(\text{joe}) \}$

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$\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2, \mathbf{c}_3$, and \mathbf{c}_4 are the optimal GA censors for $\mathcal{E} = \langle \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P} \rangle$.

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How to deal with multiple GA sensors?

- 1 choose any **arbitrary** GA sensor
 - a random choice does not seem to make much sense
- 2 choose a **predefined** GA sensor
 - how? More information would be needed
- 3 keep **all** the GA sensors
 - query answering is done with respect to all the GA sensors
 - **skeptical entailment**: only the query answers that are true in all the GA sensors are returned
 - studied in **[IJCAI 2019]**

Entailment of Boolean Conjunctive Queries (BCQs)

Given a CQE instance $\mathcal{E} = \langle \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P} \rangle$ and a BCQ q , we are interested in

Boolean Conjunctive Query (BCQ) entailment under GA censors

i.e., deciding whether $\mathcal{T} \cup \text{Th}_{\mathbf{c}} \models q$ for *every* optimal GA censor \mathbf{c} for \mathcal{E} .

Example (cntd):

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Entailment of Boolean Conjunctive Queries (BCQs)

Major computational problem:

Skeptical entailment is **coNP-hard** in data complexity (i.e., w.r.t. the size of the ABox only) even for ontology languages/Description Logics of **low expressiveness**

e.g.:

- the Description Logics of the *DL-Lite* family (and thus **OWL2 QL**)
- the Description Logics of the \mathcal{EL} family (and thus **OWL2 EL**)

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Towards the identification of a practical approach, in [ISWC 2020] we introduced the notion of **Intersection GA (IGA) censor**

An *IGA censor* cens_{IGA} for a CQE instance $\mathcal{E} = \langle \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P} \rangle$ is a function that returns the *intersection* $\text{Th}_{\text{cens}_{IGA}}$ of the theories of all optimal GA censors for \mathcal{E} .

BCQ entailment under IGA censors: deciding if $\mathcal{T} \cup \text{Th}_{\text{cens}_{IGA}} \models q$ for a BCQ q

Example (cont'd):

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BCQ Entailment is *first-order (FO) rewritable*, and thus in AC^0 in data complexity for *DL-Lite_R* and *OWL2QL* [Cima et al., ISWC 2020].

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What does **first-order rewritable** mean?

for every BCQ Q , we can build a first-order (e.g. SQL) query Q' such that the evaluation of Q' on the **initial knowledge base** is true iff the query Q is true in the IGA censor

Consequences:

- no need to modify the knowledge base (ABox)
- no need to modify the query answering system

- good computational properties
- deterministic, **unique solution**
- but **non-optimal** in terms of disclosed information
- however, "**quasi-optimal**" ([IJCAI 2020])

- 1 The Controlled Query Evaluation approach in Ontologies and Description Logics
 - CQE in Description Logics through GA sensors
 - Computational problems
- 2 Towards tractability 1: Intersecting the sensors
 - IGA sensors
 - Expressive limitations of IGA sensors
- 3 Towards tractability 2: Adding preferences
 - Globally optimal and Pareto-optimal sensors
 - DD and k-DD sensors
 - Experimental results
- 4 Towards tractability 3: Maximally cooperative approach
 - The dynCQE approach
 - Complexity of dynCQE
- 5 Conclusions

Two main limitations arise:

- **the policy allows only for CQs** in denial assertions, thus ruling out practically relevant formulas, e.g.,

$$\forall x, y. \text{Diabetic}(x) \wedge \text{admissionWard}(x, y) \wedge y \neq \text{'orthopedics'} \rightarrow \perp$$

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In [ISWC 2021], we have enriched the framework and considered:

- 1 CQs using **comparison predicates** (i.e., \neq, \geq, \leq, \dots) in policy assertions
- 2 priorities between ontology predicates, specifying (intentionally) **preferences in disclosing facts** involved in a secret

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- A **prioritized CQE instance** \mathcal{E}_\succ is a tuple $\langle \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P}, \succ \rangle$ such that $\langle \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P} \rangle$ is a CQE instance and \succ is an *acyclic priority relation over ontology predicates*.
- If $P_1 \succ P_2$, e.g., TakesMedA \succ Diabetic, in case a secret involves facts over P_1 and P_2 , we prefer to disclose those over P_1 and hide those over P_2 .

Desiderata:

- **new notion of censor** taking in the due account the preference relation and that in case $\succ = \emptyset$ *coincides with the notion of GA censor*.
- definition allowing for **practical CQE over prioritized ontologies**, i.e., for which BCQ entailment is *FO rewritable* for the DLs of the *DL-Lite* family.
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
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- We initially adapted to our framework the well-known *Pareto* and *Global* optimality notions introduced by [Staworko et al., AMAI 2012] for consistent query answering (CQA) over databases, and then adopted in [Bienvenu and Bourgaux, KR 2020] for CQA over prioritized DL ontologies.
- We first defined **Pareto (P)** and **Global (G)** sensors, and then their approximated version based on intersection, i.e., **Intersection P (IP)** and **Intersection G (IG)** sensors
- For $\gamma = \emptyset$, the sets of Pareto, Global and optimal GA sensors coincide, and the IP, IG and IGA sensor coincide.
- **Data Complexity of BCQ entailment for DL-Lite:**
 - under **P** and **IP** sensors is **coNP-hard**
 - under **G** and **IG** sensor is Π_2^P -**hard**(follow from [Bienvenu and Bourgaux, KR 2020])


Relationship between censors

(and data complexity of BCQ entailment for *DL-Lite*)



An arrow from X to Y indicates that X is a **sound approximation** of Y ,
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Looking for a practical notion of preference-based censor



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DD-censors

Given $\mathcal{E}_\succ = \langle \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{P}, \succ \rangle$ we define $DD_0(\mathcal{E}_\succ) = DC_0(\mathcal{E}_\succ) = \emptyset$, and

$$DD_{i+1}(\mathcal{E}_\succ) = \{\alpha \in \text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A}) \mid \text{for each secret } \mathcal{S} \text{ s.t. } \alpha \in \mathcal{S} \text{ there is } \beta \in \mathcal{S} \text{ s.t. } \\ \beta \neq \alpha \text{ and either } \alpha \succ \beta \text{ or } \beta \in DC_i(\mathcal{E}_\succ)\}$$

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A **Deterministically Disclosed (DD)** censor for \mathcal{E}_\succ returns the **least fix point** $DD(\mathcal{E}_\succ)$ for $DD_i(\mathcal{E}_\succ)$, which **always exists and it is unique**.

Example (cntd)

$\mathcal{T} = \{ \text{TakesMedB} \sqsubseteq \exists \text{admissionWard}; \text{Diabetic} \sqsubseteq \exists \text{admissionWard} \}$

$\mathcal{A} = \{ \text{TakesMedA}(\text{bob}), \text{TakesMedB}(\text{bob}), \text{Diabetic}(\text{bob}), \text{TakesMedA}(\text{ann}), \\ \text{Diabetic}(\text{ann}), \text{TakesMedA}(\text{joe}) \}$

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$\mathcal{P} = \{ \forall x. \text{TakesMedA}(x) \wedge \text{Diabetic}(x) \rightarrow \perp; \forall x. \text{TakesMedB}(x) \wedge \text{Diabetic}(x) \rightarrow \perp \}$

Secrets = $\{ \{ \text{TakesMedA}(\text{bob}), \text{Diabetic}(\text{bob}) \}, \{ \text{TakesMedB}(\text{bob}), \text{Diabetic}(\text{bob}) \}, \\ \{ \text{TakesMedA}(\text{ann}), \text{Diabetic}(\text{ann}) \} \}$

Priorities: $\text{TakesMedB} \succ \text{Diabetic}$

$DD_1(\mathcal{E}_\succ) = \{ \text{TakesMedA}(\text{joe}), \text{TakesMedB}(\text{bob}) \}$ $DC_1(\mathcal{E}_\succ) = \emptyset$

$DD_2(\mathcal{E}_\succ) = DD_1(\mathcal{E}_\succ)$ $DC_2(\mathcal{E}_\succ) = \{ \text{Diabetic}(\text{bob}) \}$

$DD_3(\mathcal{E}_\succ) = DD_2(\mathcal{E}_\succ) \cup \{ \text{TakesMedA}(\text{bob}) \}$ $DC_3(\mathcal{E}_\succ) = DC_2(\mathcal{E}_\succ)$

$DD_4(\mathcal{E}_\succ) = DD_3(\mathcal{E}_\succ)$ $DC_4(\mathcal{E}_\succ) = DC_3(\mathcal{E}_\succ)$

from DD-censors to k -DD-censors

BCQ entailment under DD censors, i.e., deciding whether $\mathcal{T} \cup DD(\mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{I}}) \models q$ for a BCQ q , is **PTIME-hard** in data complexity for **DL-Lite**

By fixing a k , we get $DD_k(\mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{I}})$, which we call **k -DD censor** for $\mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{I}}$.

Give a positive integer k , **BCQ entailment under k -DD censors**, i.e., deciding whether $\mathcal{T} \cup DD_k(\mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{I}}) \models q$ for a BCQ q , is **FO rewritable and thus in AC^0** in data complexity for **DL-Lite_A**

Example (cntd)

$\mathcal{T} = \{ \text{TakesMedB} \sqsubseteq \exists \text{admissionWard}; \text{Diabetic} \sqsubseteq \exists \text{admissionWard} \}$

$\mathcal{A} = \{ \text{TakesMedA}(\text{bob}), \text{TakesMedB}(\text{bob}), \text{Diabetic}(\text{bob}), \text{TakesMedA}(\text{ann}), \text{Diabetic}(\text{ann}), \text{TakesMedA}(\text{joe}) \}$

$\mathcal{P} = \{ \forall x. \text{TakesMedA}(x) \wedge \text{Diabetic}(x) \rightarrow \perp; \forall x. \text{TakesMedB}(x) \wedge \text{Diabetic}(x) \rightarrow \perp \}$

Priorities: TakesMedB \succ Diabetic

for $k = 3$ we have $DD_k(\mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{I}}) = \{ \text{TakesMedA}(\text{joe}), \text{TakesMedB}(\text{bob}), \text{TakesMedA}(\text{bob}) \}$

Given the CQ $q(x) : \neg \text{TakesMedA}(x)$ and $k = 3$, $q(\vec{x})$ is reformulated in the FO query $q'(x) : \neg \text{TakesMedA}(x) \wedge (\neg \text{Diabetic}(x) \vee \text{TakesMedB}(x))$. The evaluation of q' over \mathcal{A} returns $\{\text{bob}, \text{joe}\}$, which is the set of answers under k -DD-censor for $k = 3$ (in this specific case this holds for any $k \geq 3$).

from DD-censors to k -DD-censors

BCQ entailment under DD censors, i.e., deciding whether $\mathcal{T} \cup DD(\mathcal{E}_{\succ}) \models q$ for a BCQ q , is **PTIME-hard** in data complexity for **DL-Lite**

By fixing a k , we get $DD_k(\mathcal{E}_{\succ})$, which we call **k -DD censor** for \mathcal{E}_{\succ} .

Give a positive integer k , **BCQ entailment under k -DD censors**, i.e., deciding whether $\mathcal{T} \cup DD_k(\mathcal{E}_{\succ}) \models q$ for a BCQ q , is **FO rewritable and thus in AC^0** in data complexity for **DL-Lite_A**

Example (cntd)

$\mathcal{T} = \{ \text{TakesMedB} \sqsubseteq \exists \text{admissionWard}; \text{Diabetic} \sqsubseteq \exists \text{admissionWard} \}$

$\mathcal{A} = \{ \text{TakesMedA}(\text{bob}), \text{TakesMedB}(\text{bob}), \text{Diabetic}(\text{bob}), \text{TakesMedA}(\text{ann}), \text{Diabetic}(\text{ann}), \text{TakesMedA}(\text{joe}) \}$

$\mathcal{P} = \{ \forall x. \text{TakesMedA}(x) \wedge \text{Diabetic}(x) \rightarrow \perp; \forall x. \text{TakesMedB}(x) \wedge \text{Diabetic}(x) \rightarrow \perp \}$

Priorities: TakesMedB \succ Diabetic

for $k = 3$ we have $DD_k(\mathcal{E}_{\succ}) = \{ \text{TakesMedA}(\text{joe}), \text{TakesMedB}(\text{bob}), \text{TakesMedA}(\text{bob}) \}$

Given the CQ $q(x) : \neg \text{TakesMedA}(x)$ and $k = 3$, $q(\vec{x})$ is reformulated in the FO query $q'(x) : \neg \text{TakesMedA}(x) \wedge (\neg \text{Diabetic}(x) \vee \text{TakesMedB}(x))$. The evaluation of q' over \mathcal{A} returns $\{\text{bob}, \text{joe}\}$, which is the set of answers under k -DD-censor for $k = 3$ (in this specific case this holds for any $k \geq 3$).

from DD-censors to k -DD-censors

BCQ entailment under DD censors, i.e., deciding whether $\mathcal{T} \cup DD(\mathcal{E}_{\succ}) \models q$ for a BCQ q , is **PTIME-hard** in data complexity for **DL-Lite**

By fixing a k , we get $DD_k(\mathcal{E}_{\succ})$, which we call **k -DD censor** for \mathcal{E}_{\succ} .

Give a positive integer k , **BCQ entailment under k -DD censors**, i.e., deciding whether $\mathcal{T} \cup DD_k(\mathcal{E}_{\succ}) \models q$ for a BCQ q , is **FO rewritable and thus in AC⁰** in data complexity for **DL-Lite_A**

Example (cntd)

$\mathcal{T} = \{ \text{TakesMedB} \sqsubseteq \exists \text{admissionWard}; \text{Diabetic} \sqsubseteq \exists \text{admissionWard} \}$

$\mathcal{A} = \{ \text{TakesMedA}(\text{bob}), \text{TakesMedB}(\text{bob}), \text{Diabetic}(\text{bob}), \text{TakesMedA}(\text{ann}), \text{Diabetic}(\text{ann}), \text{TakesMedA}(\text{joe}) \}$

$\mathcal{P} = \{ \forall x. \text{TakesMedA}(x) \wedge \text{Diabetic}(x) \rightarrow \perp; \forall x. \text{TakesMedB}(x) \wedge \text{Diabetic}(x) \rightarrow \perp \}$

Priorities: TakesMedB \succ Diabetic

for $k = 3$ we have $DD_k(\mathcal{E}_{\succ}) = \{ \text{TakesMedA}(\text{joe}), \text{TakesMedB}(\text{bob}), \text{TakesMedA}(\text{bob}) \}$

Given the CQ $q(x) : \neg \text{TakesMedA}(x)$ and $k = 3$, $q(\vec{x})$ is reformulated in the FO query $q'(x) : \neg \text{TakesMedA}(x) \wedge (\neg \text{Diabetic}(x) \vee \text{TakesMedB}(x))$. The evaluation of q' over \mathcal{A} returns $\{\text{bob}, \text{joe}\}$, which is the set of answers under k -DD-censor for $k = 3$ (in this specific case this holds for any $k \geq 3$).

from DD-censors to k -DD-censors

BCQ entailment under DD censors, i.e., deciding whether $\mathcal{T} \cup DD(\mathcal{E}_{\succ}) \models q$ for a BCQ q , is **PTIME-hard** in data complexity for **DL-Lite**

By fixing a k , we get $DD_k(\mathcal{E}_{\succ})$, which we call **k -DD censor** for \mathcal{E}_{\succ} .

Give a positive integer k , **BCQ entailment under k -DD censors**, i.e., deciding whether $\mathcal{T} \cup DD_k(\mathcal{E}_{\succ}) \models q$ for a BCQ q , is **FO rewritable and thus in AC^0** in data complexity for **DL-Lite_A**

Example (cntd)

$\mathcal{T} = \{ \text{TakesMedB} \sqsubseteq \exists \text{admissionWard}; \text{Diabetic} \sqsubseteq \exists \text{admissionWard} \}$

$\mathcal{A} = \{ \text{TakesMedA}(\text{bob}), \text{TakesMedB}(\text{bob}), \text{Diabetic}(\text{bob}), \text{TakesMedA}(\text{ann}), \text{Diabetic}(\text{ann}), \text{TakesMedA}(\text{joe}) \}$


$\mathcal{P} = \{ \forall x. \text{TakesMedA}(x) \wedge \text{Diabetic}(x) \rightarrow \perp; \forall x. \text{TakesMedB}(x) \wedge \text{Diabetic}(x) \rightarrow \perp \}$

Priorities: TakesMedB \succ Diabetic

for $k = 3$ we have $DD_k(\mathcal{E}_{\succ}) = \{ \text{TakesMedA}(\text{joe}), \text{TakesMedB}(\text{bob}), \text{TakesMedA}(\text{bob}) \}$

Given the CQ $q(x) : \neg \text{TakesMedA}(x)$ and $k = 3$, $q(\vec{x})$ is reformulated in the FO query $q'(x) : \neg \text{TakesMedA}(x) \wedge (\neg \text{Diabetic}(x) \vee \text{TakesMedB}(x))$. The evaluation of q' over \mathcal{A} returns $\{\text{bob}, \text{joe}\}$, which is the set of answers under **k -DD-censor** for $k = 3$ (in this specific case this holds for any $k \geq 3$).

Completing the picture



An arrow from X to Y indicates that X is a **sound approximation** of Y , i.e., what is entailed under X is entailed also under Y

Experiments

- We implemented our technique and tested it over the **NPD** benchmark [Lanti et al., EDBT 2015] (approximated to *DL-Lite_A*)
- We specified a policy \mathcal{P} with 6 denials, a priority relation \succ specifying 6 priorities, and selected 9 queries from the benchmark
- We executed each query in six settings: the first with empty policy and priority relation (\emptyset, \emptyset) , the second with policy \mathcal{P} and no priorities (\mathcal{P}, \emptyset) , the others with policy \mathcal{P} , priorities in \succ , and $k = 1, 3, 5, 7$
- For $k \leq 3$, time is only slightly affected, and for 6 out of 9 queries we get already the same answers we obtain for $k > 3$. For $k > 3$, the gain in the number of answers is limited, and for 4 queries performances decrease.

	q_3 [5]		q_4 [4]		q_5 [6]		q_9 [5]		q_{12} [10]		q_{13} [7]		q_{14} [5]		q_{18} [9]		q_{44} [6]	
Setting	#	time	#	time	#	time	#	time	#	time	#	time	#	time	#	time	#	time
\emptyset, \emptyset	910	207	1558	168	17254	585	1566	320	96671	5665	22541	811	141439	2553	339	1525	5078	221
\mathcal{P}, \emptyset	910	278	252	295	14797	825	416	331	13028	2876	9374	2861	62255	12372	311	1804	325	153
$\mathcal{P}, \succ, 1$	910	221	252	179	17254	612	416	216	96671	5933	22541	914	125656	4145	311	1384	325	112
$\mathcal{P}, \succ, 3$	910	249	521	1445	17254	749	1252	1148	96671	5378	22541	716	131791	15873	311	1416	4630	1952
$\mathcal{P}, \succ, 5$	910	242	566	8942	17254	723	1456	7715	96671	5219	22541	732	132127	1625K	311	4733	4630	522K
$\mathcal{P}, \succ, 7$	910	472	—	t.o.	17254	993	—	t.o.	96671	7691	22541	912	—	t.o.	311	5464	—	t.o.

- Our experiments show the **applicability of our technique in practice**
- Our results hold also for **general CQs** (i.e., non-Boolean ones)
- Our FO rewritability result holds for **CQs with comparison predicates** (provided that the $DL-Lite_A$ TBox satisfies a **safeness** condition)
- But: k -DD censor is only a **sound approximation** of the real (intractable) semantics of preferences

- 1 The Controlled Query Evaluation approach in Ontologies and Description Logics
 - CQE in Description Logics through GA sensors
 - Computational problems
- 2 Towards tractability 1: Intersecting the sensors
 - IGA sensors
 - Expressive limitations of IGA sensors
- 3 Towards tractability 2: Adding preferences
 - Globally optimal and Pareto-optimal sensors
 - DD and k-DD sensors
 - Experimental results
- 4 Towards tractability 3: Maximally cooperative approach
 - The dynCQE approach
 - Complexity of dynCQE
- 5 Conclusions

In [ISWC 2022] we have proposed a "dynamic" approach to CQE called **dynCQE**

In dynCQE, the censors are progressively selected according to the user queries

We prove that this is the only possible approach that satisfies the "**longest-honeymoon**" property (*be honest as long as you can*)

Such a cooperative behavior:

- takes into account the user's interests
- allows for revealing more information than all the previous approaches

Example (cont'd)

- $\mathcal{T} = \emptyset$, $\mathcal{A} = \{ A(o), B(o) \}$, $\mathcal{P} = \{ \exists x (A(x) \wedge B(x)) \rightarrow \perp \}$
- $OptCens(\mathcal{E}) = \{ \{A(o)\}, \{B(o)\} \}$
- Given $q = A(o)$, we have that:
 - $\mathcal{T} \cup \{A(o)\} \models q$ (honest)
 - $\mathcal{T} \cup \{B(o)\} \not\models q$ (liar)
- No good reason to lie, but we have to “**remember**” that q was asked!

Example

$$\mathcal{P} = \{ \exists x, y (\text{Buy}(x, y) \wedge \text{Antiseizure}(y)) \rightarrow \perp, \\ \exists x, y (\text{Buy}(x, y) \wedge \text{Contains}(y, \text{phenytoin})) \rightarrow \perp \}$$
$$\mathcal{T} = \{ \text{DrugA} \sqsubseteq \text{Antiseizure} \}$$
$$\mathcal{A} = \{ \text{Buy}(\text{ann}, d_1), \text{DrugA}(d_1), \text{Buy}(\text{bob}, d_2), \text{Contains}(d_2, \text{phenytoin}) \}$$

Example

$$\mathcal{P} = \{ \exists x, y (\text{Buy}(x, y) \wedge \text{Antiseizure}(y)) \rightarrow \perp, \\ \exists x, y (\text{Buy}(x, y) \wedge \text{Contains}(y, \text{phenytoin})) \rightarrow \perp \}$$

$$\mathcal{T} = \{ \text{DrugA} \sqsubseteq \text{Antiseizure} \}$$

$$\mathcal{A} = \{ \text{Buy}(\text{ann}, d_1), \text{DrugA}(d_1), \text{Buy}(\text{bob}, d_2), \text{Contains}(d_2, \text{phenytoin}) \}$$

$$\mathcal{C}_1 = \{ \text{Buy}(\text{ann}, d_1), \text{Buy}(\text{bob}, d_2) \}$$

$$\mathcal{C}_2 = \{ \text{Buy}(\text{ann}, d_1), \text{Contains}(d_2, \text{phenytoin}) \}$$

$$\mathcal{C}_3 = \{ \text{DrugA}(d_1), \text{Antiseizure}(d_1), \text{Buy}(\text{bob}, d_2) \}$$

$$\mathcal{C}_4 = \{ \text{DrugA}(d_1), \text{Antiseizure}(d_1), \text{Contains}(d_2, \text{phenytoin}) \}$$

Example

$$\mathcal{P} = \{ \exists x, y (\text{Buy}(x, y) \wedge \text{Antiseizure}(y)) \rightarrow \perp, \\ \exists x, y (\text{Buy}(x, y) \wedge \text{Contains}(y, \text{phenytoin})) \rightarrow \perp \}$$

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$$\mathcal{C}_3 = \{ \text{DrugA}(d_1), \text{Antiseizure}(d_1), \text{Buy}(\text{bob}, d_2) \}$$

$$\mathcal{C}_4 = \{ \text{DrugA}(d_1), \text{Antiseizure}(d_1), \text{Contains}(d_2, \text{phenytoin}) \}$$

$$q_1 = \text{Buy}(\text{ann}, d_1)$$

Example

$$\mathcal{P} = \{ \exists x, y (\text{Buy}(x, y) \wedge \text{Antiseizure}(y)) \rightarrow \perp, \\ \exists x, y (\text{Buy}(x, y) \wedge \text{Contains}(y, \text{phenytoin})) \rightarrow \perp \}$$

$$\mathcal{T} = \{ \text{DrugA} \sqsubseteq \text{Antiseizure} \}$$

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~~$$\mathcal{C}_3 = \{ \text{DrugA}(d_1), \text{Antiseizure}(d_1), \text{Buy}(\text{bob}, d_2) \}$$~~

~~$$\mathcal{C}_4 = \{ \text{DrugA}(d_1), \text{Antiseizure}(d_1), \text{Contains}(d_2, \text{phenytoin}) \}$$~~

$$q_1 = \text{Buy}(\text{ann}, d_1)$$

\implies We have both that $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{C}_1 \models q_1$ and $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{C}_2 \models q_1$
The system answers *true*

Example

$$\mathcal{P} = \{ \exists x, y (\text{Buy}(x, y) \wedge \text{Antiseizure}(y)) \rightarrow \perp, \\ \exists x, y (\text{Buy}(x, y) \wedge \text{Contains}(y, \text{phenytoin})) \rightarrow \perp \}$$

$$\mathcal{T} = \{ \text{DrugA} \sqsubseteq \text{Antiseizure} \}$$

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~~$$\mathcal{C}_4 = \{ \text{DrugA}(d_1), \text{Antiseizure}(d_1), \text{Contains}(d_2, \text{phenytoin}) \}$$~~

$$q_2 = \text{DrugA}(d_1)$$

Example

$$\mathcal{P} = \{ \exists x, y (\text{Buy}(x, y) \wedge \text{Antiseizure}(y)) \rightarrow \perp, \\ \exists x, y (\text{Buy}(x, y) \wedge \text{Contains}(y, \text{phenytoin})) \rightarrow \perp \}$$

$$\mathcal{T} = \{ \text{DrugA} \sqsubseteq \text{Antiseizure} \}$$

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~~$$\mathcal{C}_4 = \{ \text{DrugA}(d_1), \text{Antiseizure}(d_1), \text{Contains}(d_2, \text{phenytoin}) \}$$~~

$$q_2 = \text{DrugA}(d_1)$$

\implies No censor (among the surviving ones) entails q_2 !

The system answers *false*

Example

$$\mathcal{P} = \{ \exists x, y (\text{Buy}(x, y) \wedge \text{Antiseizure}(y)) \rightarrow \perp, \\ \exists x, y (\text{Buy}(x, y) \wedge \text{Contains}(y, \text{phenytoin})) \rightarrow \perp \}$$

$$\mathcal{T} = \{ \text{DrugA} \sqsubseteq \text{Antiseizure} \}$$

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$$q_3 = \exists x \text{ Contains}(x, \text{phenytoin})$$

Example

$$\mathcal{P} = \{ \exists x, y (\text{Buy}(x, y) \wedge \text{Antiseizure}(y)) \rightarrow \perp, \\ \exists x, y (\text{Buy}(x, y) \wedge \text{Contains}(y, \text{phenytoin})) \rightarrow \perp \}$$

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$$\mathcal{C}_2 = \{ \text{Buy}(\text{ann}, d_1), \text{Contains}(d_2, \text{phenytoin}) \}$$

$$\mathcal{C}_3 = \{ \text{DrugA}(d_1), \text{Antiseizure}(d_1), \text{Buy}(\text{bob}, d_2) \}$$

$$\mathcal{C}_4 = \{ \text{DrugA}(d_1), \text{Antiseizure}(d_1), \text{Contains}(d_2, \text{phenytoin}) \}$$

$$q_3 = \exists x \text{ Contains}(x, \text{phenytoin})$$

\implies We have that $\mathcal{C}_2 \models q_3$

The system answers *true*

We keep track of the history of user queries through the notion of state:

State

A *state* of a CQE instance \mathcal{E} is a pair $\mathcal{S} = \langle \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{Q} \rangle$ where $\mathcal{Q} = \langle q_1, \dots, q_n \rangle$ is a sequence of BUCQs

The set $StCens(\mathcal{S}_n)$ of *censors of the state* $\mathcal{S}_n = \langle \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{Q}_n \rangle$ is recursively defined as follows:

- $StCens(\mathcal{S}_0) = OptCens(\mathcal{E})$
- for $1 \leq i \leq n$:
 - $StCens(\mathcal{S}_i) = StCens(\mathcal{S}_{i-1})$, if $\nexists \mathcal{C} \in StCens(\mathcal{S}_{i-1})$ s.t. $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{C} \models q_i$
 - $StCens(\mathcal{S}_i) = \{\mathcal{C} \in StCens(\mathcal{S}_{i-1}) \mid \mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{C} \models q_i\}$, otherwise

We say that the state \mathcal{S}_n **entails** q_i ($\mathcal{S}_n \models q_i$) if $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{C} \models q_i$ for all the censors $\mathcal{C} \in StCens(\mathcal{S}_n)$

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 - $StCens(\mathcal{S}_i) = \{\mathcal{C} \in StCens(\mathcal{S}_{i-1}) \mid \mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{C} \models q_i\}$, otherwise

We say that the state \mathcal{S}_n **entails** q_i ($\mathcal{S}_n \models q_i$) if $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{C} \models q_i$ for all the censors $\mathcal{C} \in StCens(\mathcal{S}_n)$

Maximal cooperativity

We say that \mathcal{C} is **maximally cooperative** w.r.t. \mathcal{Q} if there do not exist a censor \mathcal{C}' and a number m s.t.:

- $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{C} \models q_i \iff \mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{C}' \models q_i$ for every $1 \leq i \leq m$, and
- $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{C} \not\models q_{m+1}$ and $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{C}' \models q_{m+1}$.

Theorem

Every censor for \mathcal{E} is maximally cooperative w.r.t. \mathcal{Q} iff
 $\mathcal{C} \in \text{StCens}(\langle \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{Q} \rangle)$

Maximal cooperativity

We say that \mathcal{C} is **maximally cooperative** w.r.t. \mathcal{Q} if there do not exist a censor \mathcal{C}' and a number m s.t.:

- $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{C} \models q_i \iff \mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{C}' \models q_i$ for every $1 \leq i \leq m$, and
- $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{C} \not\models q_{m+1}$ and $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{C}' \models q_{m+1}$.

Theorem

Every censor for \mathcal{E} is maximally cooperative w.r.t. \mathcal{Q} iff
 $\mathcal{C} \in \text{StCens}(\langle \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{Q} \rangle)$

Query entailment problem

We study the data complexity of the following decision problem for OWL 2 QL ontologies:

Query entailment in a state

Given a state $\mathcal{S} = \langle \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{Q} \rangle$ and a BUCQ $q \in \mathcal{Q}$, check whether $\mathcal{S} \models q$

We proved that the above problem is **FO-rewritable**, i.e. it is always possible to reformulate q into a FO query q_r such that $\mathcal{S} \models q$ iff $\mathcal{A} \models q_r$

- No need to materialize censors
- Problem belongs to AC^0 class in data complexity

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First-order rewriting example

Example (cont'd)

The query $q_3 = \exists x \text{ Contains}(x, \text{phenytoin})$ can be rewritten as:

$$\begin{aligned} q_r = & \neg \text{Buy}(\text{ann}, d_1) \wedge \neg \text{DrugA}(d_1) \wedge \exists x \text{ Contains}(x, \text{phenytoin}) \vee \\ & \neg(\text{Buy}(\text{ann}, d_1) \wedge \text{DrugA}(d_1) \wedge \neg(\top)) \wedge \exists x (\text{Buy}(\text{ann}, d_1) \wedge \\ & \quad \text{Contains}(x, \text{phenytoin}) \wedge \neg(d_1 = x)) \vee \\ & \neg \text{Buy}(\text{ann}, d_1) \wedge (\exists x (\text{DrugA}(d_1) \wedge \text{Contains}(x, \text{phenytoin}))) \vee \\ & \exists x (\text{Buy}(\text{ann}, d_1) \wedge \text{DrugA}(d_1) \wedge \text{Contains}(x, \text{phenytoin})) \wedge \neg(\top \vee d_1 = x) \end{aligned}$$

Due to the **second disjunct**, we have that q_r evaluates to true in \mathcal{A} (indeed we had that $\mathcal{S} \models q_3$)

- 1 The Controlled Query Evaluation approach in Ontologies and Description Logics
 - CQE in Description Logics through GA sensors
 - Computational problems
- 2 Towards tractability 1: Intersecting the sensors
 - IGA sensors
 - Expressive limitations of IGA sensors
- 3 Towards tractability 2: Adding preferences
 - Globally optimal and Pareto-optimal sensors
 - DD and k-DD sensors
 - Experimental results
- 4 Towards tractability 3: Maximally cooperative approach
 - The dynCQE approach
 - Complexity of dynCQE
- 5 Conclusions

- Extend the results to **different knowledge bases/databases** (beyond DLs)
- Improve the **user/attacker model**
- Increase the **policy language**
- Increase the **query language**
- Optimized practical **algorithms**
- More powerful notions of **ensor** (not only tuple-deletion based)

- Extend the dynCQE framework to **non-Boolean UCQs**
- **Implement** dynCQE (as we did for previous frameworks)
- Extend the **policy language** (as done for static CQE)
- Refine the current framework for allowing to **delete specific cells** of a table instead of full tuples

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